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PAROLE REVOCATION HEARINGS-
PRO JUSTICIA OR PRO CAMERA STELLATA?
The need to improve the nation's penal system is becoming
increasingly recognized. In a recent address Chief Justice Warren
E. Burger stressed the need for rehabilitation rather than revenge
in the penal process: 1
[The nation must] do something about the most neglected, the most
crucial and probably the least understood phase of the administration
of justice, [the penal system] .... We find lawyers and judges be-
coming so engrossed with procedures and techniques that they tend to
lose sight of the purpose of a system of justice. We should stop think-
ing of criminal justice as something which begins and ends with a final
judgment of guilt. 2
The Chief Justice's attitude is a welcome variance from the tra-
ditional "hands off" policy of the United States Supreme Court in
this field.' The Court's disinterest in securing fair treatment for con-
victs is mirrored by the indifference of the American public. One
area which cries out for reform is the parole system.
Parole, as defined by the California Supreme Court, is the
release of a prisoner prior to the expiration of his term of imprison-
ment, conditioned upon his continuing good behavior.4 This com-
ment will consider the action taken by the state when it believes the
parolee has violated his parole. Specifically, this comment will ex-
plore parole revocation procedures which result in a denial of the
right to counsel, the right to confront witnesses, the right to utilize
the subpoena power, the right to local hearings, and the right to the
benefit of the exclusionary rule.
PAROLE REVOCATION PROCEDURES
Parole revocation in California is essentially a three-step pro-
cedure which begins with the parole agent's report of a violation.5
A convict is free to remain on parole until he violates one of the
1 "Last week he reaffirmed his concern with prison reform in two tough speeches
-to the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and the American Bar Asso-
ciation in Atlanta." TiarE, March 2, 1970, at 66.
2 Id.
3 Rubin, Administrative Response to Decisions, 15 CRrME & DELINQUENCY 377,
380 (1969). See Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal
to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963); Rose v. Haskins,
388 F.2d 91, 102 (6th Cir. 1968).
4 In re Peterson, 14 Cal. 2d 82, 85, 92 P.2d 890, 891 (1939).
5 Parole Agent's Manual, ch. 4, 1964.
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parole conditions6 or commits a crime. If a condition is violated,
the parole agent has the discretionary power to issue a report of the
CALIFORNIA CDC Form 1515:
CONDITIONS OF PAROLE
1. RELEASE: Upon release from the institution you are to go directly to the
program approved by the Parole and Community Services Division and shall
report to the Parole Agent or any other person designated by the Parole and
Community Services Division.
2. RESIDENCE: Only with approval of your Parole Agent may you change your
residence or leave the county of your residence.
3. WORK: It is necessary for you to maintain gainful employment. Any change
of employment must be reported to, and approved by, your Parole Agent.
4. REPORTS: You are to submit a written monthly report of your activities,
including any arrests, on forms supplied by the Parole and Community
Services Division unless directed otherwise by your Parole Agent. This report
is due at the Parole Office not later than the fifth day of the following month,
and shall be true, correct, and complete in all respects.
5. ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES: The unwise consumption of alcoholic beverages and
liquors is a major factor in parole failures.
*A. You shall not consume alcoholic beverages or liquors to excess.
B. You shall not consume ANY alcoholic beverages or liquor.
*Strike out either A or B, leaving whichever clause is applicable.
6. NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS AND HYPNOTIC DRUGS: You may not possess, use,
or traffic in any narcotic drugs, as defined by Division 10 of the Health and
Safety Code, or dangerous or hypnotic drugs, as defined by Section 4211 of
the Business and Professions Code, in violation of the law. If you have ever
been convicted of possession, sale, or use of narcotic drugs, or have ever used
narcotic drugs, or become suspected of possessing, selling, or using narcotic
drugs, you hereby agree to participate in anti-narcotic programs in accordance
with instructions from your Parole Agent.
7. WEAPONS: You shall not own, possess, use, sell, nor have under your control
any deadly weapons or firearms.
8. ASSOCIATES: You must avoid association with former inmates of penal in-
stitutions unless specifically approved by your Parole Agent; and you must
avoid association with individuals of bad reputation.
9. MOTOR VEHICLES: Before operating any motor vehicle you must secure the
written permission of your Parole Agent, and you must possess a valid
operator's license.
10. COOPERATION: You are to cooperate with the Parole and Community Services
Division and your Parole Agent at all times.
11. LAWS: You are to obey all municipal, county, state, and federal laws, and
ordinances.
12. PERSONAL CONDUCT: You are to conduct yourself as a good citizen at all
times, and your behavior and attitude must justify the opportunity granted
by this parole.
13. CIVIL RIGHTS: A number of your Civil Rights have been suspended by law.
You may not engage in business, sign certain contracts, or exercise certain
other Civil Rights unless your Parole Agent recommends, and the Adult
Authority grants the restoration of such Civil Rights to you. There are some
Civil Rights affecting your everyday life which the Adult Authority has
restored to you, BUT you may not exercise these without the approval of
your Parole Agent. You should talk to your Parole Agent about your Civil
Rights to be sure you do not violate this condition of your parole. The fol-
lowing are some of the Civil Rights which have been restored to you at this
time:
A. You may make such purchases of clothing, food, transportation, household
furnishings, tools, and rent such habitation as are necessary to maintain your-
self and keep your employment. You shall not make any purchases relative
to the above on credit except with the written approval of your Parole
Agent.
B. You are hereby restored all rights under any law, relating to employees,
such as rights under Workmen's Compensation Laws, Unemployment Insur-
ance Laws, Social Security Laws, etc. (Reference is here made to Adult
Authority Resolution No. 199)
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violation to the parole unit supervisor.7 If the parole agent and the
unit supervisor decide that the violation is serious, parole is sus-
pended and the parolee is taken into custody.' However, if the
parole violation is the commission of a crime the revocation pro-
cedure differs. If the crime is a misdemeanor and the parolee is sen-
tenced to eighty-nine days or less, the procedure is the same as for
a non-criminal violation.9 If the crime is a misdemeanor and the
parolee is sentenced to at least ninety days but less than six months,
the violation is reported to the Adult Authority for disposition. Re-
gardless of the sentence, the agent must report any sex or narcotics
offense or any arrest for a large-scale fraudulent scheme. 10 If the
crime is a felony or a misdemeanor for which the parolee is sen-
tenced to six months or more, parole is automatically suspended.
The second step in the revocation procedure is the ex parte
Parole and Community Service ("P&CS") Hearing." Here the
written report and other pertinent information is presented to the
hearing board. The parole agent's report not only contains a sug-
gested disposition of the case, but a sketch of the parolee's history. 2
Neither parole agent nor parolee are present; the report is sub-
mitted to the board, usually by the unit supervisor. 3 The composi-
tion of the hearing board usually consists of one Adult Authority
member and one hearing representative. 4 Upon consideration of the
report, the board can recommend either continuation on parole or a
formal revocation hearing." If a formal hearing is recommended,
the parolee is transferred from the county jail, to the Reception-
Guidance Center at Vacaville, California.' 6 Usually the parolee is
not informed of the official charges against him until he is trans-
ferred to Vacaville. 1T
14. CASH ASSISTANCE: In time of actual need, as determined by your Parole
Agent, you may be loaned cash assistance for living expenses or employment;
or you may be loaned such assistance in the form of meal and hotel tickets.
You hereby agree to repay this assistance; and this agreement and obligation
remain even though you should be returned to prison as a parole violator.
Your refusal to repay, when able, may be considered an indication of un-
satisfactory adjustment.
15. SPECIAL CONDITIONS: [As listed].
7 Parole Agent's Manual, ch. 4, 1964.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMM. ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1970 REPORT
ON PAROLE REVOCATION PROCEDURES, Feb. 19, 1970, at 2. [Hereinafter cited as: 1970
COMm. REPORT.]
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
I'- Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 3.
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The final step in the revocation process is the actual revocation
hearing which is conducted by two hearing representatives, normally
within three weeks of the "P&CS"' I Hearing. The board gives the
parolee an opportunity to plead to the alleged violation, then pro-
ceeds to review his record. 9 Due to the large number of cases the
board hears each day, the usual procedure is for one hearing repre-
sentative to question the parolee while the other reviews the next
case. 0 By utilizing this method, the board hears many more cases
each day. After considering the parolee's testimony, the "P&CS"
Hearing report, and other reports in the parolee's file, the board
renders its decision. The hearing board either reinstates or revokes
parole.2' If parole is revoked the maximum prison term is imposed.22
SHORTCOMINGS OF THE REVOCATION PROCEDURE
During the entire revocation procedure, from the time the pa-
role agent submits his report to the actual revocation, the parolee
is never afforded the protection of basic Constitutional rights which
are guaranteed to ordinary citizens. It is established California law
that the parolee need be given neither notice nor a hearing when his
parole is revoked.23 Even though a parolee receives a hearing, he
does not have any of the following rights: To counsel,24 to present
adverse witnesses,2" to cross-examine witnesses,28 or to have a local
hearing. The deprivation of these rights renders the parolee's
defense impotent.
The "P&CS" Hearing is especially devoid of due process pro-
tections. The ex parte nature of this hearing should not be taken
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 4.
23 CAL. PEN. CODE § 3060 (West 1956) provides: "The Adult Authority shall
have full power to suspend, cancel, or revoke any parole without notice, and to order
returned to prison any prisoner upon parole. The written order of any member of the
Adult Authority shall be a sufficient warrant for any peace or prison officer to return
to actual custody any conditionally released or paroled prisoner." Eason v. Dickson,
390 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1968); In re McLain, 55 Cal. 2d 78, 84, 357 P.2d 1080, 1084, 9
Cal. Rptr. 824, 828 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 10 (1961).
The 'California Supreme Court recommended affording parolees notice and hearing
in order to discourage needless judicial review and impart a sense of fairness in the
state's dealings with parolees. In re Gomez, 64 Cal. 2d 591, 594 n.1, 414 P.2d 33, 35
n.1, 51 Cal. Rptr. 97, 99 n.1 (1966).
24 Mead v. California Adult Authority, 415 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1969); Williams
v. Dunbar, 377 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 866 (1968); In re
Schoengarth, 66 Cal. 2d 295, 425 P.2d 200, 57 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1967).
25 Williams v. Dunbar, 377 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 866
(1968).
26 Id.
27 1970 Comm. REPoaT at 2, supra note 11.
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lightly, even though it is preliminary. Actually the "P&CS" Hearing
is more important than the revocation hearing, because this hearing
effectually determines whether parole will be revoked. Once the case
reaches the revocation stage, 98 percent of the cases result in revo-
cation. 8 The parolee could protect his interests better if present at
this hearing, since it is here that the actual determination is made.
The later revocation hearing is essentially a "rubber stamp" pro-
cedure.
Although present at the revocation hearing, the parolee is
denied the right to counsel.29 The inaccessibility of witnesses and
an unfamiliarity with the law impose upon the parolee a tremendous
burden in attempting to defend himself. Because the revocation
hearing is held at the state prison in Vacaville, the parolee is often
unable to afford the luxury of having his witnesses testify at the
hearing. The distance to the prison from the witnesses' homes can
very often make it impossible for them to attend the hearing. In
addition, the parolee is not able to compile evidence on his own, be-
cause he is in prison without bail. The inability of the parolee to
present a potent defense is not the only unfair aspect of this hear-
ing. The added fact that the parolee has no effective means of chal-
lenging any spurious evidence against him makes the proceedings
much more one-sided. The evidence against the parolee consists of
numerous reports which cannot be questioned;" ° hence there is no
opportunity for the parolee to verify the testimony of those who
spoke against him. The "faceless witnesses" who are not present at
the hearing may have a prejudicial interest to serve by their testi-
mony. There is also the possibility that the parole agent was less
than objective in his analysis of the facts.3 ' California parole revo-
cation hearings are so devoid of basic Constitutional protections
that they are reminiscent of "Star Chamber" proceedings.
Confrontation of Witnesses
For two centuries past, the policy of the Anglo-American system of
Evidence has been to regard the necessity of testing by cross-exam-
ination as a vital feature of the law. The belief that no safeguard for
testing the value of human statements is comparable to that furnished
28 Id. at 3.
29 Cases cited note 24 supra.
30 1970 Comm. REPORT at 2, supra note 11.
31 Id. at 5. "Parole agents are human and it is possible that friction between
the agent and parolee may have influenced the agent's judgment. In fairness to the
violator, this is a possibility which should be investigated by some higher author-
ity. . . ." Sklar, Law and Practice in Probation and Parole Revocation Hearings, 55
J. Cmm. L.C. & P.S., 175, 196 (1964) (quoting from Attorney General's 1939 Survey
of Release Procedures).
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by cross-examination, and the conviction that no statement (unless by
special exception) should be used as testimony until it has been probed
and sublimated by that test, has found increasing strength in length-
ening experience.3 2
The right to cross-examine and challenge the testimony pre-
sented against a person is not only indigenous to our society, but it
was also recognized in early Christian history." Our Constitution
via the sixth amendment guarantees the right to confront witnesses
in a criminal trial. Constitutionally, however, this right is not ex-
tended to all administrative hearings, even though many adminis-
trative proceedings have the same results as criminal trials. 4
California parole revocation proceedings do not allow the
parolee to confront the witnesses against him." The testimony at
the hearings is presented by written reports and documents, which
are not susceptible to cross-examination. California courts consist-
ently maintain that the parolee does not have the right of confron-
tation since parole revocation is an administrative action. 6
The United States Supreme Court has held that confrontation
is essential at administrative hearings when the loss the defendant
stands to suffer is of sufficient magnitude. The Court allowed con-
frontation of witnesses in Greene v. McElroy 7 when an engineer
lost his security clearance. There, it was established that revocation
of a security clearance would, in fact, preclude the engineer from
working in a wide field of employment.3 " The United States Supreme
Court's willingness to protect employment rights should be extended
to the protection of a much more basic right,39 personal freedom.
Confronting an adverse witness not only allows the parolee to
test the witness' reliability, but it also allows the hearing board to
consider the demeanor and attitude of the witness. 0 False and self-
serving statements are less likely to be made in the presence of the
32 J. WIGMORE, EVMENC. § 1367 (3d ed. 1940).
83 When Festus more than two thousand years ago reported to King Agrippa
that Felix had given him a prisoner named Paul and that the priests and elders desired
to have judgment against Paul, Festus is reported to have said: "It is not the manner
of the Romans to deliver any man to die, before that he which is accused have the
accusers face to face, and have licence to answer for himself concerning the crime
laid against him." Acts 25:16.
34 Juvenile proceedings, proceedings for the commitment of the mentally ill,
proceedings for those who have communicable diseases, as well as parole revocation
hearings very often result in confinement.
35 Williams v. Dunbar, 377 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 866
(1968).
36 Id.
37 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
38 Id.
39 Id. at 486, 487.
40 Rittenour v. District of Columbia, 163 A.2d 558 (D.C. Muni. Ct. App. 1960).
[Vol. 10
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accused. Although the parole agent is responsible for verifying
statements made by witnesses, he is often unable to do so adequately,
presumably because of his enormous case load.4 Even if the major-
ity of witnesses are truthful, cross-examination should be extended
to discredit those who are not.
Cross-examination would also allow the parolee the opportu-
nity to question the parole agent. Since the agent is responsible for
the instigation of revocation proceedings, it is important to ascertain
whether or not he was biased in his report.
42
Subpoena Power
The sixth amendment also provides the basis for the right to
subpoena witnesses at criminal proceedings. The United States
Supreme Court has considered very few cases which involve the
right of compulsory process at administrative hearings, because the
power is granted to most significant agencies, and when not con-
ferred is usually not needed. 3 However, in Missouri ex rel Hurwitz v.
North44 the Court found that the subpoena power is basic to a
hearing, no matter what form or procedure the hearing assumes.4
In Jewell v. McCann,46 the Ohio Supreme Court declared unconsti-
tutional an administrative procedure because it did not provide for
compulsory process.47 Jewell involved the revocation of a doctor's
license to practice medicine. Impressed by the consequences of such
a revocation, the court found a fair hearing inherently required com-
48pulsory process.
California does not provide for compulsory process at the parole
revocation hearing. If the power to subpoena witnesses existed, the
parolee would be able to secure testimony which would have a sub-
stantial effect on the Adult Authority's revocation decisions. Sub-
poena power would increase the parolee's chance of remaining on
parole. Furthermore, the revocation hearing would neither be seri-
ously hampered nor restrained by the extension of the power to sub-
poena witnesses.
41 R. CLEGG, PROBATION AND PAROLE, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES (1964).
42 Supra note 31.
4 W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, AD M ISTRATiVE LAW 613 (4th ed. 1960).
44 271 U.S. 40 (1926).
45 Id. at 42. North is not squarely on point however, because the Court found
that the right to introduce compelled depositions is substantially equivalent to the
subpoena power. In parole revocation hearings, the parolee does not even possess the
power to have depositions compelled.
46 95 Ohio St. 191, 116 N.E. 42 (1917).
47 Id. at 193, 116 N.E. 43 (1917).
48 Id.
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Location of the Hearings
California "P&CS" Hearings are held in Los Angeles and San
Francisco, 49 while formal revocation hearings are held in Vaca-
ville.' Hearings are conducted at these locations for the conve-
nience of the Adult Authority. By conducting the hearings at the
present locations, the state is effectively denying the parolee vital
evidentiary sources.," The parolee is faced with formidable obstacles
in obtaining or presenting evidence in his favor. As previously
noted, the parolee cannot avail himself of the subpoena power.
Therefore the distance to be traveled and the resulting loss of time
and wages, if employed, is a deterrent to witnesses who would other-
wise voluntarily appear on his behalf.
This disadvantage is recognized in federal government pro-
ceedings. Chief Justice Burger, then of the District of Columbia
Circuit Court, ruled that federal parole revocation hearings must
be conducted at or near the location of the alleged violation.5 2
Localized hearings would contribute to an atmosphere of fairness
if they were granted in California revocation proceedings.
There is no doubt that local hearings would impose greater
demands upon the Adult Authority, perhaps even requiring an ex-
pansion of the Authority with a resulting increase of cost to the
state. However, the cost factor must be weighed against the unfair-
ness to the parolee of conducting the hearings at the present loca-
tions, where he cannot present a meaningful defense. Hearings,
then, must be localized in order for California revocation hearings
to project even a minimal amount of fairness.
Right to Counsel
The sixth amendment right to representation by counsel is not
extended to the parolee at the parole revocation hearing. However,
the right to counsel, in this type of proceeding, is assured in eighteen
states by statute. 5 The right to counsel is also guaranteed at federal
parole revocation hearings."
49 1970 CoMM. REPORT at 2, supra note 11.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963). The court saw the vital need for
a local hearing, and concluded that a local hearing is within the congressional scheme
of fairness. However, Hyser is not California law. Id. at 243-44.
53 Comment, Due Process: The Right to Counsel in Parole Release Hearings, 54
IOWA L. REV. 497, 499 (1968).
54 Fleming v. Tate, 156 F.2d 849 (D.C. Cir. 1946); now the right to counsel in
federal hearings is granted by statute.
[Vol. 10
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In 1963 the United States Supreme Court interpreted the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment to include the protec-
tions of the sixth amendment. 5 However, at first the Court was
reluctant to extend the right to counsel beyond the actual criminal
trial. Recent decisions expanded this rule so that the defendant is
now given the right to representation by counsel at all "critical
periods" before and after the actual trial.
Mempha v. Rhay5" extended the "critical period" to include
the probation revocation hearing. Advocates of the right to counsel
at the parole revocation hearing were encouraged by the Mempka
decision because of the similarities between parole and probation.
57
However, courts refuse to extend Mempha to parole revocation hear-
ings5 because Mempha protects the probationer prior to sentencing;
in parole proceedings the sentencing has already taken place.59
Until recently courts would not extend representation by coun-
sel to administrative hearings. The first administrative hearings
which required representation by counsel were those involving
commitment for mental deficiency or communicable disease. 60 Re-
cent judicial opinion sees the controlling factor to be the commit-
ment proceeding, not the classification of the proceeding. Depri-
vation of liberty compels the right to representation by counsel. 1
In California parole revocation hearings are administrative
hearings which almost invariably result in reimprisonment. The
Court's willingness to extend the sixth amendment right to counsel
to other administrative proceedings should also apply to parole
revocation hearings. The parolee stands to lose much more than
the mentally ill, since a return to prison means a loss of most Con-
55 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
56 389 U.S. 128 (1967). The United States Supreme Court, in holding that a
convicted criminal has a right to counsel at a probation revocation hearing, reasoned
that probation is a deferment of the actual sentencing, which is within the critical
period. The Court also emphasized the probationer's need for assistance in marshalling
the facts, introducing evidence of mitigating circumstances, and aiding and assisting
the defendant to present his case at the sentencing stage. Id. at 135-37.
57 Ex parte Anderson, 191 Ore. 409, 230 P.2d 770 (1951).
58 Eason v. Dickson, 390 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1968) ; Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91
(6th Cir. 1968) ; Williams v. Patterson, 389 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1968).
59 Id.
60 Dooling v. Overholser, 243 F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Howard v. Overholser,
130 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1942) ; Richey v. Superior Court, 59 Wash. 2d 872, 371 P.2d
51 (1962); see also, Comment, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill in California:
1969 Style, 10 SANTA CLARA LAW. 74, 82-86 (1969); Cohen, The Function of the
Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 424 (1966).
61 Hereyford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968). "[W]e think the reason-
ing in Gault emphatically applies. It matters not whether the proceedings be labeled
'civil' or 'criminal' or whether the subject matter be mental instability .... It is the
likelihood of involuntary incarceration ...which commands observance of the Con-
stitutional safeguards of due process." Id. at 396.
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stitutional rights in addition to the parolee's loss of liberty. Never-
theless, California persists in denying the right to counsel at parole
revocation hearings on the basis that these are administrative pro-
ceedings.
2
Gideon v. Wainwright6" extended the sixth amendment to the
states because of a defendant's inability to properly defend himself.
The Court reasoned that a defendant who is uneducated in the law
and unable to procure witnesses is, in the absence of counsel, denied
an adequate defense. 4 Its reasoning in Gideon is also applicable to
the parolee's situation at the revocation hearing. Because of the
denial of counsel, the parolee is denied an adequate defense.65 At
the parole revocation hearing, the parolee can do little more than
protest his innocence. Although a parole revocation hearing is an
administrative procedure, the Gideon rule should nevertheless be
applicable, as the consequences are of the same magnitude.6"
Those who oppose representation by counsel at the revocation
hearing often do so on the ground that the hearing will become a
battleground between parole authorities and the attorney.6" This
very argument was presented to the District of Columbia Circuit
Court in Fleming v. Tate68 and rejected as unfounded. That court
believed that more harm than good would result from the denial of
counsel.6 9
In a revocation hearing without the aid of counsel, there is a
very real danger that parole will be revoked without "good cause. ' 70
62 Cases cited note 24 supra.
68 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
64 Id. at 341.
65 1970 Comm. REPORT at 4-5, supra note 11.
66 Jones v. Rivers, 338 F.2d 862, 877 (4th Cir. 1964) (concurring specially). "[Alt
stake in a revocation hearing, when the parolee denies the violation, are issues no less
momentous than in the original trial." Id.
67 Chappell, Due Process of Law as it Relates to Corrections, FEDERAL PROBATION,
Sept. 1965, at 3. "[The parole and penal system] is a sensitive area. In fact there is a
danger that it might become a battle area, with lawyers and the courts on one side
and social workers and persons in the correctional field on the other. The difficulty
with such a conflict is that if anyone wins at all, it is bound to be a Pyrrhic
victory. .. ."
68 156 F.2d 849 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
69 Id. at 850.
70 CAL. PEN. CODE § 3063 (West 1956) provides: "No parole shall be suspended
or revoked without cause, which cause must be stated in the order suspending or
revoking the parole."
In re Smith, 33 Cal. 2d 797, 205 P.2d 662 (1949), suggests that although "good
cause" is required for there to be grounds for a revocation, this requirement is
loosely interpreted; e.g., in Williams v. Dunbar, 377 F.2d 505, 506 (9th Cir. 1967)
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 866 (1968), someone entered parolee's home with a key and
destroyed several hundred dollars worth of his wife's clothes, while leaving his un-
touched. Parolee was at home a short time later, but made no report to parole agent
[Vol. 10
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The presence of an attorney would greatly increase the assurance
that the parolee is not reincarcerated without "good cause." The
presence of an attorney, furthermore, would materially aid the
rehabilitative ends of parole.
Certainly no circumstances could further that purpose [the rehabili-
tation of a parolee] to a greater extent than a firm belief on the part
of such offender in the impartial, unhurried, objective, and thorough
processes of the machinery of the law.71
The extension of the right to counsel to parole revocation hearings
would be in the best interest not only of the parolee but also of the
state.
The Exclusionary Rule
The California Supreme Court recently held, in the case of In
re Martinez,7 that the Adult Authority could consider illegally
seized evidence at the parole revocation hearing. It allowed the hear-
ing board to consider evidence, the illegality of which earlier resulted
in a reversal of the criminal charge. The court supported its holding
on two bases: That extension of this rule would strangle the Author-
ity in legalistic niceties while exposing the public to parole violators
freed on technicalities and that it would not substantially achieve
the deterrence of illegal police activity.73 The court discussed the
exclusionary rule only in relationship to the deterrence of illegal
police activity.74 It did not consider the more important reasons for
the exclusionary rule: Vindication of the right itself,7 5 and the main-
tenance of judicial integrity.76 The court seems to have overlooked
the fact that the primary purpose of the rule is to protect the ac-
cused, not to discourage illegal police activity.77
The court's concern for the safety of the public is a dubious
excuse for denying the extension of the rule.78 Not only should pro-
of the events. This led parole authority to believe parolee was not co-operating with
them. The Adult Authority found that the alleged non co-operation was sufficient cause
to merit revocation of parole.
71 Fleming v. Tate, 156 F.2d 849, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
72 1 Cal. 3d 641, 463 P.2d 734, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1970).
73 Id. at 650, 463 P.2d at 740, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
74 Id.
75 Brennan, Court Decisions and Crime, 15 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 449, 451(1969). The author of this article is United States Supreme Court Associate Justice
William J. Brennan.
76 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 223 (1960). "[E]xistence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe
the law scrupulously. . . .Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a law
breaker, it breeds contempt for law. .. ." Id.
77 Brennan, supra note 75, at 451-52.
78 California Assembly Committee Progress Report on Criminal Procedures, Crime
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tection of the public not be controlling, but the court's fear is also
the type which is prevalent whenever there is a liberalization of
criminal procedure. This "stock" recitation of fear for the public
is similar to the apprehension which shrouded Escobedo v. IllinoiS
79
and Miranda v. Arizona. 0 The court's fear in Martinez is probably
just as unfounded as the fear expressed by the losing argument in
Miranda.8 '
Extension of the exclusionary rule would further impress the
parolee with the fairness of the revocation hearing and strengthen
his impression of judicial integrity.
The Denial of Due Process
Parole administrators are adamant in their denial of a need for
due process because they feel that it will only hinder and encumber
their efforts.12 The right to counsel creates special problems for
administrators because they fear that the presence of an attorney
at the hearing will result in an adversary proceeding laced with
legal formalities.8 3
Courts are much more analytical in their reasoning. Some
simply state that due process, an elusive concept, varies with the
nature of the proceeding, the right involved, and the possible bur-
den on that proceeding. 4 Others cite one of four theories for the
denial of due process: The contract theory, parens patriae, right-
privilege distinction and the theory of constructive custody.
The contract theory, per se, is not espoused by the California
Supreme Court as one of the reasons for denying due process. The
court does allude to the existence of a contract between the parolee
and the Adult Authority in a number of decisions.85 However, these
and Penalties in California, at 41 (May, 1968). "[Clalculations of the actual size of
the impact of parolee crime also suggest that the consideration of public safety per-
haps need not or can not be the controlling element in parole policy." Id.
79 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
80 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
81 Seeburg & Wettick, Miranda in Pittsburgh-A Statistical Study, 29 U. PrrT.
L. REV. 1 (1967) ; Medalie, Zietz & Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in Our
Nation's Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 Micn. L. REv. 1347 (1968);
Robinson, Police and Prosecutor Attitudes Relating to Interrogation as Revealed by
Pre- and Post-Miranda Questionnaires: A Construct of Police Capacity to Comply,
1968 DUKE L.J. 425.
82 Burdman, The Conflict Between Freedom and Order, 15 CRIMEa & DELINQUENCY
371-75 (1969).
83 Id.
84 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
85 In re Peterson, 14 Cal. 2d 82, 92 P.2d 890 (1939). See also In re Schoengarth, 66
Cal. 2d 295, 425 P.2d 200, 57 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1967) ; People v. Denne, 141 Cal. App.
2d 499, 297 P.2d 451 (1956). In the case of In re Tenner, 20 Cal. 2d 667, 674, 128
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decisions usually involve an early release conditioned upon the
parolee's agreement to return to another state for criminal prosecu-
tion.86 If the parolee accepts parole he must surrender himself to the
officials of another state; if he rejects the offer, he must then remain
in prison.
The contract theory in some other states rests on the waiver
principle. The parolee waives his right to a fair hearing by accept-
ing the conditions of parole."7
The contract theory is of dubious legality due to the coercive
nature of the waiver. It is questionable whether the parolee is able
to consent to the waiver in view of the precarious position he is in.
Furthermore, the idea of waiver suggests that the parolee would
otherwise have a right to a hearing and the protections of the Con-
stitution. If the parolee does not possess the right to a hearing,
what purpose does the waiver serve?
The most recent theory espoused for the deprivation of due
process at parole revocation hearings is parens patriae,18 first ap-
plied in Hyser v. Reed,8 9 and resting upon the assumption that the
Adult Authority, in revoking parole, occupies the role of a parent
withdrawing a privilege from an errant child, not as punishment,
but for misuse of the privilege.9"
The viability of the parens patriae theory is very much in doubt
since the United States Supreme Court rejected it as the reason
for deprivation of due process in juvenile hearings.9' The Court's
action would seem to be equally applicable to parole revocation
hearings, since in both instances the individual's liberty is at stake.
The most recited reason for depriving the parolee of due process
is the right-privilege distinction. The foundation for this theory
stems from Escoe v. Zerbst,92 which states that parole is a statutory
creation with no basis in the Constitution; therefore, statutory law
is binding." Implicit in this theory is the notion that the Adult
P.2d 338, 341 (1942), the court stated: "One convicted of crime has the right to
reject an offer of parole, but once having elected to accept parole, the parolee is
bound by the express terms of his conditional release."
86 In re Kilmer, 37 Cal. 2d 568, 233 P.2d 902 (1951) ; In re Tenner, 20 Cal. 2d670, 128 P.2d 338 (1942) ; In re Peterson, 14 Cal. 2d 82, 92 P.2d 890 (1939).87 In re Lorette, 126 Vt. 286, 228 A.2d 790 (1967) ; Fuller v. State, 122 Ala. 32,
26 So. 146 (1899).
88 In re Martinez, 275 Cal. App. 2d 55, 79 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1969), vacated; Hyser
v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
89 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
90 In re Martinez, 275 Cal. App. 2d 55, 61, 79 Cal. Rptr. 686, 692 (1969),
vacated.
91 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
92 295 U.S. 490 (1935).
93 Id. at 492.
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Authority is doing the parolee a favor by granting a parole; further,
that the parolee should not impose upon the Authority by seeking
due process. However, the theory that a privilege can be withdrawn
in any manner the grantor may choose has come under increasing
attack. The United States Supreme Court recently decided that
although one may not possess a certain right, once the right is
granted it can be revoked only by means consistent with due pro-
cess. 4 The Court has also attacked the right-privilege concept
through the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment95
and the right to procedural due process, which necessitates a hear-
ing to substantiate the claimed violation. 6
The majority of California decisions rely on the concept of
"constructive custody" when they deny due process at the parole
revocation hearing.9 7 "Constructive custody" is a legal fiction which
maintains that the parolee is always in the custody of the Adult
Authority, via the parole agent.18 Because the custody is not actual
custody, and, in fact, not custody at all, it is called "constructive
custody." An Alice in Wonderland fantasy, the court speaks of
"constructive custody" as being the extension of the prison walls
to the whole world; for this reason they compare the parolee to a
prison "trusty." 99
Recent court decisions discount the "constructive custody"
theory, and instead speak of "conditional freedom."' 00 A legal defini-
tion of "conditional freedom" does not exist; however, there is no
doubt that it envisions parole in a more realistic light. "Condi-
tional freedom" is a term which places the parolee between actual
freedom and "constructive custody." The parolee does not possess
the rights of an ordinary citizen, yet he is not a "trusty." "Condi-
tional freedom" probably means that the parolee is a free man
except for the conditions of parole.
PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
Humanizing the parole system presents no easy task. The
California Legislature in 1969 discussed eight different bills which
94 Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
95 See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) ; Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 398 (1954) ; Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
96 See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) ; Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
97 People v. Contreras, 154 Cal. App. 2d 321, 315 P.2d 916 (1957); People v.
Denne, 141 Cal. App. 2d 499, 297 P.2d 451 (1956).
98 See authorities cited in note 23, supra.
99 People v. Denne, 141 Cal. App. 2d 499, 508, 297 P.2d 451, 457 (1956).
100 In re Martinez, 1 Cal. 3d 641, 646, 463 P.2d 734, 737, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382, 385
(1970) ; Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91, 98 n.2 (6th Cir. 1968).
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sought to change the parole system; however, none became law.' 0
The current California Legislature Committee on Criminal Pro-
cedures recently published its final report on parole revocation in
which it recommended that the parolee be given early notice of the
alleged violation, that he should have a speedy hearing, that he
should have a right to be present at his hearing, that he should
have a right to have counsel represent him, that a hearing should
be held in the county of his residence or in the county where the
alleged violation took place, and that parole conditions should
relate to conduct which is reasonably connected with the parolee's
potential criminality.'0 2 If the Legislature is amenable to these rec-
ommendations, California will have one of the fairest procedures
for revoking parole.
CONCLUSION
The California parole revocation procedure gives the appear-
ance of providing a modicum of fair treatment to an accused parole
violator through the "P&CS" and revocation hearings. This appear-
ance of fair play is, however, illusory. Beyond denying fair play,
whether or not the accused is technically entitled to the constitu-
tional safeguards accorded "first class" citizens, the present parole
revocation procedures undoubtedly thwart the purposes of our penal
system, defeating rather than benefiting the purposes of rehabilita-
tion.. Not only is the person injured, society as a whole is offended.
The position taken by the Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court indicates the possibility, if not the likelihood, of
vast changes in the realm of parole. Hopefully, the dawning of a
change in our applied penal psychology is just a matter of time.
The change is imminent. The question is: How much longer must
parolees wait?
Rodney I. Blonien
101 Comment, Rights Versus Results: Quo Vadis Due Process for Parolees, 1
PAcT Ic L.J. 321, 323 (1970).
102 1970 CoMm. REPORT at 5-7, supra note 11.
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